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ABSTRACT 
There is an attempt nowadays to provide a more comprehensive and realistic safety assessment of design and 
operation of Nuclear Power Plants. In this context, innovative approaches are being proposed for safety as-
sessment of nuclear power plants design including both design basis conditions and design extension condi-
tions. An area of research aims at developing methods for combining insights from probabilistic and deter-
ministic safety analyses in Option 4, also called realistic approach, from the International Atomic Energy 
Agency specific safety guide. The development of Option 4 or realistic approach involves the adoption of best 
estimate computer codes, best estimate assumptions on systems availability and best estimate of initial and 
boundary conditions for the safety analysis. This paper focusses on providing the fundamentals and practical 
implementation of an approach to integrate PSA-based probabilistic models and data, which incorporate best 
estimate assumptions on the availability of safety systems, into Option 4. It is presented a practical approach 
to identify relevant, i.e. most probable, configurations of safety systems and to assess the associated occur-
rence probability of each configuration using PSA models and data of a NPP, which is based on the use of a 
Pure Monte Carlo method. An example of application is provided to demonstrate how this approach performs. 
The case study focusses on an accident scenario corresponding to the initiating event “Loss Of Feed Water 




Extended BEPU, PSA, Option 4, realistic approach, probabilistic, deterministic, uncertainty, safety analysis, 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
AFW Auxiliary Feedwater system 
AS Accidental Sequence 
BEk Basic Event k belonging to the Boolean Equation (BE) of a TCij  
BEAS Boolean Equation of AS 
BEPU Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty methodology 
BESFi Boolean Equation of SFi 
BETCij Boolean Equation of TCij 
CCFCommon Cause Failure 
CD Core Damage  
CDF Core Damage Frequency 
DBA Design Basis Accidents 
DBC Design Basis Conditions 
DEC Design Extension Conditions  
DSA Deterministic Safety Analysis 
EBEPU Extended BEPU methodology 
ET Event Tree 
FB Feed and Bleed 
FOM Figure Of Merit 
FOS First Order Statistics 
FT Fault Tree 
IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency 
IE Initiating Event 
IHI High Pressure Injection system – injection mode  
IHR High Pressure Injection system – recirculation mode 
LB Licensing Basis 
LOFW Loss of Feed Water initiating event 
MCS Minimal Cut Set 
MSIV Main Steam Isolation Valve 
NRC Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
NPP Nuclear Power Plant 
OS Order Statistics 
PDF Probability Distribution Function 
PMCM Pure Monte Carlo Method 
PORV Pressure Operated Relief Valves 
PRZ Pressurizer 
PSA Probabilistic Safety Analysis 
PWR Pressurized Water Reactor 
RCSReactor Coolant System 
RPS Reactor Protection System 
RV Relief Valve 
SD Steam-Dump valve 
SFi Safety Function i 
SG Steam Generator 
STL Standard Tolerance Level 
SV Safety Valve  
TCij Train/Component j of Safety Function i 
TH  Thermal Hydraulic 
TOPs Top Events 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Nuclear industry has relied on the concept of defense in depth and safety margins to deal with the uncertain-
ties associated with the design and operation of nuclear facilities. In this context, both deterministic and prob-
abilistic safety analyses are performed with an aim to achieve regulatory approval of Nuclear Power Plant 
(NPP) design and operation according to well-established licensing basis.  
 
The adoption by regulators of the risk-informed decision-making philosophy [1] represents a key milestone to 
understand both the evolving regulatory framework and the growing research interest towards developing 
methods for using Probabilistic Safety Analysis (PSA) results into requirements and assumptions in Deter-
ministic Safety Assessment (DSA) and vice versa. There is an attempt to provide a more comprehensive and 
realistic safety assessment of reactor design and operation. In addition, Fukushima Daiichi accident has raised 
new challenges such as the revision of current design license basis accounting for not only design basis condi-
tions (DBC), e.g. anticipated occupational occurrences and design basis accidents (DBA), but also design ex-
tension conditions (DEC), e.g. DEC without and with fuel damage, in a context where innovative approaches 
of safety assessment of current NPP are welcome. 
 
What concerns DSA (Deterministic Safety Analysis), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) pro-
duced guidance on the use of deterministic safety analysis for the design and licensing of nuclear power 
plants (NPPs): ‘‘Deterministic Safety Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants Specific Safety Guide,’’ Specific 
Safety Guide No. SSG-2 [2], which is now under revision [3]. SSG- 2 addresses four options for the applica-
tion of DSA.  
 
Options 1 and 2 are conservative and they have been used since the early days of civil nuclear power, and are 
still widely used today. However, the desire to utilize current understanding of important phenomena and the 
availability of reliable tools for more realistic safety analysis without compromising plant safety has led many 
countries to use option 3. Option 3 involves the use of best-estimate codes and data together with an evalua-
tion of the uncertainties, the so called BEPU (Best Estimate Plus Uncertainty) methodology. Several BEPU 
approaches have been developed [4-11], some of them in scopes that are accepted by the regulator authorities 
nowadays. Most of them are based on propagation of input uncertainties and make use of the Wilks’–based 
methods to determine the number of calculations of the output (usually safety-related parameters) needed to 
verify compliance of acceptance criteria with “Standard Tolerance Levels (STL)” (typically 95/95) in accord-
ance with current regulatory practice. Ref. [4] provided a review of groups of tools and methods being pro-
posed up to 2008 to perform BEPU analysis, e.g. statistical methods, use of surrogate models, etc. Pourgol-
Mohammad, 2009 [5] and D’Auria et al., 2012 [6] published the fundamentals of several of them. Wilsom, 
2013 [7] presented historical insights in the development of BEPU safety analysis. Unal et al., 2011 [8] pro-
posed an improved BEPU methodology including advanced validation concepts to license evolving nuclear 
reactors and more recently Queral et al., 2015 [9] presents an application of the BEPU methodology for the 
safety analysis of a Large-Break LOCA with TRACE code of an advanced NPP. 
 
Development of Option 4 of the IAEA Specific Safety Guide SSG-2 [2, 3], which is also called realistic de-
terministic safety analysis, is currently under research. An area of research in this context aims at developing 
methods for combining insights from probabilistic and deterministic safety analyses [12, 13]. Even more, 
some research aims at developing methods for integrating deterministic and probabilistic safety assessment or 
even at developing an integrated safety assessment methodology [14-16]. The new methods, such as the one 
presented in [13], are intended to be used for safety assessment of some current NPP design basis conditions, 
e.g. anticipated occupational occurrences also called DBC-2, and design extension conditions without and 
with significant fuel degradation, which are also called DEC-A and DEC-B accidents respectively. Option 4 
is not allowed for design basis accidents (DBA) within the design basis conditions, called DBC-3 and DBC-4, 
where it is proposed only the adoption of Options 1 to 3 (see section 2.15 in Ref. [3]). 
 
In this research context, it is proposed to face the challenge of combining the use of well stablished BEPU 
methods and probabilistic-based assumptions on systems availability to build an extended BEPU methodolo-
gy, called EBEPU methodology [12, 13], following the fundamentals of Option 4 based on the IAEA SSG-2 
guide, which can be used for realistic deterministic safety analysis of current NPP designs [2, 3]. In Ref. [13], 
a novel EBEPU approach was introduced merging traditional BEPU methods and PSA-based assumptions on 
the availability of safety systems, which consists of the following steps: 
 
1. Selection of the accident scenario. 
2. Selection of the safety criteria linked to the accident scenario under study and the FOMs (Figures 
of Merit) involved in the acceptance criteria. 
3. Identification and ranking of relevant physical phenomena based on the safety criteria. 
4. Selection of the appropriate TH (Thermal Hydraulic) parameters to represent those phenomena. 
5. Identification of relevant safety-related systems involved in the accident scenario. 
6. Selection of relevant components/trains of the above redundant safety systems that are responsible 
for performing the intended safety function to mitigate accident consequences. 
7. Development of the TH computer model of the accident scenario, e.g. develop an input for 
TRACE code [17]. 
8. Association of PDF (Probability Density Functions) for each selected TH parameter. 
9. Identification of relevant, i.e. most probable, system configurations based on the availability of 
safety components/trains and association of a probability of occurrence for each configuration.  
10. Random sampling of the selected TH parameters and plant configurations. Sample size (N) will 
depend on the particular statistical method and the acceptance criterion adopted to verify com-
pliance of safety criteria. Perform N computer runs to obtain FOMs for each run. 
11. Processing the results of the multiple computer runs (N) to estimate either the probability distri-
bution of the FOMs, or rather some descriptor of this distribution, such as for example a per-
centile of the FOM, or a tolerance level of each FOM with STL using OS, e.g. the FOS. 
12. Verify compliance of acceptance criterion for each FOM 
 
The main difference between a typical BEPU and this EBEPU approach is the incorporation of steps 6 and 9 
to account for best estimate assumptions, i.e. PSA-based assumptions herein, on safety systems availability 
under the EBEPU approach. In addition, step 10 must be updated to account also for random sampling of 
safety systems configurations in addition to TH parameters. At last but not at least, the TH computer model 
must be developed in step 7 with appropriate level of detail at component/train in a coherent manner with step 
6 in order to make it possible to address the particular configuration of the safety systems required for each 
TH simulation or computer run in step 10. BEPU approaches focuses only on an enveloping sequence repre-
senting a conservative progression of the accident scenario (step 1) departing from an initiating event. Thus, 
for such an enveloping accidental sequence, it is adopted a conservative assumption on the availability of 
safety systems (steps 5 and 7), so that steps 6 and 9 are not necessary. In Ref. [18], a comparison between tra-
ditional BEPU and Extended-BEPU approaches for Deterministic Safety Analysis is presented.  
 
This paper presents a practical approach to identify relevant configurations of safety systems and to assess the 
associated occurrence probability of such configurations using PSA results of a NPP, i.e. how to develop step 
9 in the above EBEPU approach. The most relevant configurations mean the most probable ones according to 
PSA-based probabilistic models and data, which incorporate best estimate assumptions on the availability of 
safety systems. An example of application is provided to demonstrate how this approach performs. The case 
study focusses on an accident scenario corresponding to the initiating event “Loss Of Feed Water (LOFW)” 
for a typical three-loops Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR) NPP.  
 
2 METHODOLOGY 
Figure 1 provides an outline of the procedure proposed to identify a list of relevant sets of configurations of 
Trains/Components (TC) of safety systems (available/unavailable TC) and to assess the associated occurrence 
probability for each set of TC configurations using PSA models and data for a NPP. Each step of the proposed 
approach is explained next. 
 
Figure 1. Approach to identify and associate probabilities for safety systems configurations 
 
Step 1: Identification of the PSA-based initiating event, accident scenarios and safety functions.  
The procedure starts with the adoption of the Initiating Event (IE) and corresponding event tree (ET) available 
from the PSA of the NPP under study, which is normally implemented in a PSA computer software, e.g. Risk 
Spectrum software [19]. The procedure will then focus on the whole set of accident scenarios departing from 
the IE. Each Accident Scenario (AS) represents an accidental sequence belonging to the event tree, which in-
volves the simultaneous occurrence of the initiating event and either success or failure (depending on the par-
ticular sequence) of the i safety functions SFi taking part of this accidental sequence AS. Herein, the whole set 
of SFi taking part of the PSA-based ET is considered. This information is available from the PSA of the NPP 
under study and implemented in a PSA computer software.  
 
Step 2: Identification of trains and components and set configurations template x={TCij} 
Each safety function SFi in turn is developed by a number j of relevant trains/components TCij. Then, the SFi 
must be split into functional TCij depending on the particular configuration of the safety system responsible 
for performing the safety function SFi, for example, attending to the diversity and redundancy of 
trains/components performing the safety function. The procedure is repeated for each SFi in order to build up 
a generic set of configurations of Trains/Components x={TCij}. Note dimension and configuration of vector x, 
e.g. x={TC11, TC12, TC21, TC22, TC23} ,  depend on the number of safety functions and corresponding number 
of trains/components that take part of the particular accident scenario, i.e. AS, studied. 
 
Step 3: Formulate Boolean equation for each TC, i.e.   BETCij=h{BEk} 
Next, each TCij must be associated a Boolean equation, i.e. BETCij = h (BEk), which must represent the con-
dition of availability of the TCij. Then, its complementary Boolean equation, ijBETC , will represent the con-
dition of unavailability of the TCij .  
 
Figure 2 outlines the key relationships between the formulation of BETCij and the logical models and data 
taken from the PSA. Boolean equation (TOPs) functionBETCij   is the Boolean equation representing the 
condition of unavailability of j train/component of the i safety function, which can be derived by using the 
corresponding Fault Trees (FT) within the PSA modeling available and the PSA software. Normally, one can 
use FT already developed that corresponds to intermediate TOP events (TOPs) already available from the 
PSA study, which consist of logic relationships of k basic events, BEk, representing each BEk a basic unavail-
ability contribution, for example a component failure, a human error, a maintenance activity, etc., taking part 
of the TCij belonging SFi. Note, each BEk is associated a probability distribution function (PDF), which is 
taken directly from PSA data implemented in the PSA software, which are already available from the PSA 
study. For sake of usefulness in developing the next steps of the approach, instead of using the FT directly, 
the BETCij are formulated in terms of Minimal Cut Sets (MCS), )( kij BEMCSBETC  , as it is usual in PSA 
logical modeling and quantification. 
 
Figure 2. Approach to obtain Boolean equations of TCij 
 
In summary, standard PSA models and data available for the IE under study provide PDFs for BEk events of 
interests. In turn, BEk events and their corresponding PDFs are used to formulate Boolean equations BETCij = 
MCS (BEk) that are derived in terms of minimal cut sets using the PSA software. The MCS for each BETCij, 
the basic events BEk and their corresponding PDFs can be exported from the PSA software and they can be 
imported to built the corresponding equivalent Boolean Equations and probabilistic data as spreadsheets in 
Microsoft Excel with add on @Risk 7 (Palisade Decision Tools) [20]. 
 
Step 4: Evaluate each BETCij to conclude TCij is available or not  
Next, these Boolean equations and PDFs implemented as spreadsheets are used to obtain a list of relevant 
configurations of safety systems (available/unavailable) and to assess the occurrence probability of each con-
figuration developing the following steps. Note that herein relevant configurations of safety systems means 
the most probable configurations since a Pure Monte Carlo Method (PMCM) is used to look for them directly 
using the @Risk software. 
 
First, each BEk event is evaluated to occur (true) or not (false) by random sampling using its PDF and 
PMCM. Then, the resulting states of the BEk (true or false) are propagated using the corresponding Boolean 
equations MCS(BEk) to evaluate whether the trains/components TCij results in a state condition available 
(BETCij = true) or unavailable (BETCij = false). This provides a particular realization of the generic set of 
configurations of Trains/Components x={TCij}. Thus, if BETCij = “true” the corresponding TCij is replaced 
by a “1” in the generic set x or by a “0” otherwise. Each realization of the set, for example xn = {1,1,0,0,1, 
….}, represents a probabilistic/realistic configuration of safety systems given by the particular values taken 
by all TCij associated to the SFi under study. 
 
Step 5: Update list x of configurations. Sample size is representative? 
The above procedure is then repeated in order to obtain and update a list of safety system configurations, 
which is either increased with a new configuration or updated with a new occurrence of an existing one after 
every sampling. The sample size has to be adjusted as necessary, since the procedure must end once the list is 
representative of the most probable safety system configurations, i.e. there is enough diversity and repetitions 
of the most probable configurations. A criterion to stop the search may be based on the comparison of the 
probabilities of the most a less probable configurations found, e.g. when they are separated by several orders 
of magnitude. Another criterion may be that the configurations found represents a cumulative probability of 
occurrence of configurations high, such as for example 0,98 or higher. 
 
Step 6: Estimate Probability of configurations, P(x) 
Based on the repetition of the above procedure using a PMCM, it is possible to estimate the probability of oc-
currence of each configuration xn found, i.e. P(xn), based on the fraction between the number of times each 
configuration appears and the sample size. 
 
Step 7: Grouping of equivalent configurations and built a list of g groups 
Next, the list of safety system configurations is post-processed. The objective is grouping configurations that 
are equivalent to each other to build just one group for each set of equivalent configurations. For example, 
imagine a safety function consisting of three redundant trains. Thus, those configurations including the failure 
of only one of the trains would belong to the same group. In addition, those configurations including the fail-
ure of two trains would belong to another group, and so on. This way, it is possible to build a list of equiva-
lent groups, g, departing from the derived set of system configurations, x.  
 
Step 8: Estimate probability of groups P(g) 
In addition, it is possible to obtain the probability of a realization of the configuration represented by each 
group, P(gm), adding the probability P(xn) of just those xn ϵ gm. 
 
Step 9: Verify probabilities using original PSA results 
Last, in order to verify the consistency of the results found, the above Boolean equations BETCij implemented 
as spreadsheets in Microsoft Excel with add on @Risk must be used to formulate Boolean equations of the 
form BESFi = g(BETCij) in the same software to derive the logical representation of the condition of availabil-
ity of each individual safety function SFi in terms of the MCS of BEk. This Boolean equation must be equiva-
lent to the logical model built in the original PSA to represent the condition of availability of the safety func-
tion SFi. Next, these Boolean equations BESFi must be used to formulate Boolean equations representing each 
one the occurrence of the different accident scenarios, which are of the form BEAS = f (BESFi). Again, one 
must verify the results found in this way are coherent with the results derived from the original PSA quantifi-
cation. 
 
3 CASE STUDY 
3.1 Description of the PSA-based initiating event and the corresponding event tree (Step 1) 
The case study focusses on an accident scenario corresponding to the initiating event “Loss Of Feed Water” 
for a typical three-loops Pressurized Water Reactor NPP. The group LOFW includes those transients involv-
ing total loss of main feed water to steam generators (SG), which reduce water level of SG and consequently 
reduce their capacity to extract heat from the reactor coolant system (RCS). In particular, this group includes 
initiating events of category 16 and 24 in EPRI/NP-2230 [21]. Figure 3 shows a typical event tree for the 
LOFW transient taken from the level 1 PSA available and the corresponding safety functions required follow-
ing the occurrence of LOFW. 
 
Figure 3 shows two alternative ways to remove heat from the RCS once the Reactor Protection System (RPS) 
is successful to shut down the NPP. One way involves the injection of water to SG by the Auxiliary Feed Wa-
ter System (AFW) and evacuation of heat through steam-dump valves (SD), relief valves (RV) or safety 
valves (SV). Eventually, in case of RCS pressurization, there may be a need to reduce pressure by means of 
the PORV valves (and safety valves SV when required) of the pressurizer (PRZ). Second alternative involves 
removing heat from the RCS by means of “Feed and Bleed” function, i.e. extracting warm water opening 
PORV valves manually and injecting cold water using the high-pressure injection system (IHI). In addition, it 
is needed re-circulation of water from the RCS using the same system under recirculation operational mode 
(IHR) in order to keep a safe operational state of the NPP in the long term. 
3.2 Identification of Safety Functions and selection of relevant Trains/Components (Step 1) 
Each header of the event tree shown in the Figure 3 is related to a safety function in Table 1, which provides 
information on each header and the corresponding safety function name (SFi), its success criteria involving 
the Trains/Components of the safety systems performing the safety function and its relevant TCij functions. 
 
Figure 3. Event Tree for the LOFW transient 
 
Table 1. Safety functions and success criteria required for LOFW. Relevant trains/components functions. 
3.3 Set up a template of safety systems configurations, x={TCij} (Step 2) 
Next step consists of building the vector representing a generic set of configurations of availabil-
ity/unavailability of the relevant Trains/Components, i.e. x={TCij}. In this example it is quite simple to set up 
this vector by using the information provided in the last column in Table 1 as follows: 
 
x = {K, AFW1, AFW2, AFW3, PORV1o, PORV2o, SV1o, SV2o, SV3o, PORV1c, PORV2c, SV1c, 
SV2c, SV3c, SD1c, SD2c, SD3c, SD4c, SD5c, SD6c, SD7c, SD8c, MSIV1c, MSIV2c, MSIV3c, IHI1, IHI2, 
IHI3, PORV1mo, PORV2mo, FBIHI1, FBIHI2, FBIHI3, IHR1, IHR2, IHR3} 
 
Vector x encodes a generic configuration of the availability of the safety systems. One realization of vector x 
will represent a particular configuration. The above vector contains 29 variables, TCij, where each one can 
take a value either “1” to represent the corresponding TCij is in a condition available or “0” otherwise (not 
available). Thus, based on the dimension of vector x, there are 2
29
 combinations feasible (more than 500 mil-
lion combinations). So that, enumeration of all of them is impracticable and one must look forward to finding 
at least the most relevant ones. 
3.4 Formulation of the Boolean equation for TCij in terms of PSA-based top and basic events (Steps 3 and 4) 
Next step involves the development of the Boolean equations to represent the condition of availability of the 
relevant TCij. Table 2 shows intermediate TOP events considered to formulate the corresponding Boolean 
equation for each TCij based on the PSA-based logic models available. 
 
Table 2. TOP events and basic events related to safety trains and components. 
 
For example, the Boolean equation representing the condition of availability of the first of three redundant 
trains of the AFWS can be formulated based on the information provided in Table 2 as follows: 
 
GAFW001  -  1    BEAFW1  -  1  BEAFW1   (1) 
 
where, GAFW001 is the PSA-based TOP event representing the unavailability of the AFWS train 1 taken 
from the PSA available (see Figure 4). Boolean equations for the other two trains are similar. For sake of use-
fulness this top event is formulated in terms of MCS consisting of BEk taking part of the top event as usual in 
PSA logical modeling and quantification (see Table 3). In addition, each basic event BEk is associated a PDF, 
which is taken from PSA original data (see Table 4). 
 
 
Figure 4. GAFW001 top event representing unavailability of the first of three redundant AFWS trains 
 
Table 3. MCS corresponding to GAFW001 in terms of basic events. 
 
Table 4. PDF of basic events BEk of GAFW001 form original PSA data. 
 
Another example, the Boolean equations representing the condition of availability of one train of the safety 
function corresponding to “primary pressure relief opens” can be formulated for the first PORV train and for 
the first SV train respectively as follows: 
 
 1HFSPORVMGPORV007 GPORV025   - 1     BEPORV1o  - 1  BEPORV1o   (2) 
 GPORV005 GSV010   - 1     BESV1o  - 1  BESV1o 
 (3) 
 
where, GPORV025 and GPORV007 are PSA-based intermediate TOP events representing independent 
and common cause failures to open respectively of the first PORV1o train, while 1HFSPORVM is a basic 
event that represents the unavailability of the PORV1o to open due to maintenance activities. On the other 
hand, GSV010 and GPORV005 are intermediate TOP events representing independent and common cause 
failures to open respectively of the first SV1o train. 
 
Last example, which is a little bit more complex, the Boolean equations representing the condition of availa-
bility of one train of the safety function corresponding to “primary pressure relief close” can be formulated for 
the first PORV train and for the first SV train respectively as follows: 
 
GPORV085  - 1     BEPORV1c  - 1  BEPORV1c   (4) 
 1HFSPORVMGPORV007 GPORV026)*(GPORV025  *GSV150 - 1     SV1c  - 1  SV1c   (5) 
 
where, GPORV085 is an intermediate TOP event representing independent failure to close the first 
PORV1c train. On the other hand, GSV150 is an intermediate TOP event representing independent failure to 
close the first SV1c train. Note, this failure is applicable only if SV1o opens, which depends on the fact that 
both PORV1o and PORV2o fail to open. 
 
Boolean equations representing the condition of availability of the remaining TCij trains/components included 
in vector x can be formulated in a similar way based on the information provided in Table 2 and PSA models 
and data. 
3.5 Identification of relevant safety systems configurations and probabilities, x and P(x) (Steps 5 and 6) 
The Boolean equations and data presented in the previous sections are used to develop the procedure pro-
posed in Section 2. This procedure allows the identification of the relevant (the most probable) configurations 
of safety systems, i.e. relevant combinations of success and failures of safety trains/components, and at the 
same time it allows the estimation of a given probability of occurrence for each configuration.  
 
These models in terms of minimal cut sets and data have been built as spreadsheets in Microsoft Excel with 
add on @Risk 6 (Palisade Decision Tools) [20]. The identification of configurations has been performed ran-
domly by evaluating the Boolean equations based on Pure Monte Carlo sampling of the occurrence of basic 
events using their PDFs. The sample size has been adjusted manually to obtain a list of configurations that re-
sults representative as it includes enough diversity and repetitions of configurations, xm. and at the same time 
the cumulative probability is very close to one. 
 
Based on the final list of valid configurations found and the number of realizations of each configuration it is 
possible to estimate the probability of each configuration, P(xm), given approximately by the frequency of oc-
currence of each configuration as compared to the sample size. The results are presented in the following. 
 
Table 5 shows only the 32 most relevant configurations out of the 3000 found of the about 500 million con-
figurations possible based on enumeration of combinations of the 29 variables in vector x. The most relevant 
configurations represent a cumulative probability of 0,9837. In Table 5, every configuration is represented by 
a set of “1” and “0” values, each for the corresponding TCij safety train/component encoded in vector x. A 
value “1” means the TCij, e.g. PORV1o, is available while a value “0” means it is unavailable.  
 
Table 5. List of Safety Systems configurations, xn, and corresponding probabilities, P(xn). 
3.6 Grouping of equivalent configurations and probabilities, g and P(g) (Steps 7 and 8) 
Now, the list of safety system configurations found in previous section is post-processed. The objective is 
grouping configurations that are equivalent to each other to build just one group for each set of equivalent 
configurations. For example, imagine a safety function consisting of three redundant trains. Thus, those con-
figurations including the failure of only one of the trains would belong to the same group. In addition, those 
configurations including the failure of two trains would belong to another group, and so on.  
 
First step consists of building the vector representing a generic group of equivalent configurations of availa-
bility/unavailability of the relevant Trains/Components, i.e. g. In this example, it is quite simple to set up this 
vector departing from vector x as follows: 
 
g = {K, AFWS, PORVo, SVo, PORVc, SVc, SDc, MSIVc, IHI, FBIHI, PORVmo, IHR} 
 
Vector g encodes a generic group of equivalent configurations of the availability of the safety systems. One 
realization of vector g will represent a particular group. The above vector contains 12 variables, TCij, where 
each one can take a value ranging in the interval given in the corresponding component of the equivalent vec-
tor {0-1, 0-3, 0-2, 0-3, 0-2, 0-3, 0-8, 0-3, 0-3, 0-3, 0-2, 0-3}. 
 
This way, it is possible to obtain the list of equivalent groups, g, departing from the derived set of system con-
figurations, x, in the previous section. In addition, it is possible to obtain the probability of a realization of the 
configuration represented by each group, P(gm), adding the probability P(xn) of just those xn ϵ gm. 
 
Table 6 shows only the 16 most relevant groups of equivalent configurations out of the 507 groups, departing 
from 3000 configurations found of about 500 million configurations possible based on enumeration of combi-
nations of the 29 variables in vector x. The most relevant groups of configurations represent a cumulative 
probability of 0,9905. In Table 6, every configuration is represented by a set of numbers ranging each one be-
tween 0 and MAX, where MAX represents the maximum number of train/component redundancies.  
 




Figure 5 plots the probability of the groups of equivalent configurations found and their relationship with the 
accident sequence, AS, based on Figure 3. In Figure 5 most of the groups of equivalent configurations found 
belong to AS #1 as expected. For example, note that only 100 groups of 507 verifies that their probability 
P(gm) > 10
-5
, as one can realize looking at the left hand side in Figure 5, which correspond to accident scenar-
ios belonging to AS #1 mainly, AS #2 and AS #3. In addition, note those AS ending with consequence core 
damage, CD, rank in the last positions of this Figure 5 (right hand side), which is coherent with PSA quantifi-
cation results since CD may occur with very low probability once the LOFW initiating event occurs. The 
same happens for the AS corresponding to the ATWS. 
 
 
Figure 5. Plot of probabilities of groups of configurations and AS to which they belong (see Figure 3 also) 
 
4 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In this paper, it is proposed an approach that can be used to integrate probabilistic assumptions on the availa-
bility of safety system configurations into deterministic safety analysis of extensions to NPP design condi-
tions based on Option 4 of the IAEA SSG-2 guide, which will require combining the use of well stablished 
deterministic BEPU methods and realistic assumptions on availability of safety systems.  
 
In particular, this paper proposes and demonstrate the performance of an approach to address PSA-based as-
sumptions on the availability of safety systems, which allows finding realistic configurations on safety sys-
tems availability. The results of this preliminary case study demonstrate that the approach not only performs 
well but also it requires an important effort to adapt event trees, fault trees and probabilistic models and data 
available from the PSA.  
 
Direct search of the most probable configurations based on Pure Monte Carlo sampling is the method used in 
this paper, which is just an option that performs in an affordable way for the case study. Note a method based 
on the enumeration of the whole set of feasible configurations and calculation of their corresponding proba-
bility is an unaffordable option based on the dimension of vector x. Thus, 507 groups of equivalent configura-
tions corresponding to a total of 3000 configurations of safety systems have been found of about 500 million 
configurations possible based on enumeration of combinations of the 29 variables in vector x.  
 
For example, note that only 100 groups of 507 verifies that their probability P(gm) > 10
-5
, which correspond to 
accident scenarios belonging to AS #1 mainly, AS #2 and AS #3. Those AS ending with consequence core 
damage, CD, rank in the last positions, which is coherent with PSA quantification results since CD may occur 
with very low probability once the LOFW initiating event occurs. In addition, notice also that AS ending with 
consequence CD are not of interest for DSA. 
 
Last, notice that it would be possible to increase the number of configurations and groups found by increasing 
the sample size with the direct search procedure adopting Pure Monte Carlo sampling. However, future work 
should pursue the development of new and more efficient searching algorithms to find out the highest number 
of configurations possible with the lowest computational cost, since the computational effort required for 
large sample sizes increases exponentially.  
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Figure 2. Approach to obtain Boolean equations of TCij 
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Figure 3. Event Tree for the LOFW transient 
 
Flow loss from 
MDP01A to SG A
GAFW001
Flow loss from 
MDP01A
GAFW0018
Flow loss from in 
section A1
GAFW1100




























fails to remain 
openVN077U
Check Valve 




































































































































































































































































































































Figure 5. Plot of probabilities of groups of configurations and AS to which they belong (see Figure 3 also) 
 
Table 1. Safety functions and success criteria required for LOFW. Relevant trains/components functions. 
Header SFi Success Criteria TCij 
FT1 RPS Two RPS channels K 
FT2 AFWS 1/3 AFW trains AFW1, AFW2, AFW3 
FT3 PRZ-opens 1/2 PORV or 1/3 SV open (o) PORV1o, PORV2o, SV1o, SV2o, SV3o 
FT4 PRZ-closes 2/2 PORV or 3/3 SV close (c) PORV1c, PORV2c, SV1c, SV2c, SV3c 
FT5 2SG-closes 3/3 MSIV and  8/8 SD close (c) SD1c, SD2c, SD3c, SD4c, SD5c, SD6c, SD7c, SD8c, MSIV1c, 
MSIV2c, MSIV3c 
FT6 IHI 1/3 IHI trains IHI1, IHI2, IHI3 
FT7 FB 1/2 PORVm & 1/3 FBIHI PORV1mo, PORV2mo, FBIHI1, FBIHI2, FBIHI3 
FT8 IHR 1/3 IHR trains IHR1, IHR2, IHR3 
 
Table 2. TOP events and basic events related to safety trains and components. 






























K X           
AFW1  X          
AFW2   X         
AFW3    X        
PORV1o     X     X  
PORV2o      X    X  
SV1o       X    X 
SV2o        X   X 
SV3o         X  X 
PORV1c            
PORV2c            
SV1c     X X    X  
SV2c     X X    X  
SV3c     X X    X  
SD1c            
SD2c            
SD3c            
SD4c            
SD5c            
SD6c            
SD7c            
SD8c            
MSIV1c            
MSIV2c            
MISV3c            
IHI1            
IHI2            
IHI3            
FBIHI1            
FBIHI2            
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IHR1            
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Table 3. MCS corresponding to GAFW001 in terms of basic events. 
MCS Frequency % Equation 
1 8.82E-03 27.51 VE52AR 
2 8.58E-03 26.78 VK001O 
3 3.04E-03 9.49 VK001F 
4 2.92E-03 9.11 IH02AC 
5 1.46E-03 4.55 CF001I 
6 1.24E-03 3.87 M100B1M 
7 1.20E-03 3.74 BM02AR 
8 7.81E-04 2.44 VM035O 
9 7.41E-04 2.31 VE52AS 
10 4.48E-04 1.40 M500A1M 
11 3.65E-04 1.14 BM02AS 
12 3.00E-04 0.94 BM002L 
… … … … 
    
 3.24E-02   
 
Table 4. PDF of basic events BEk of GAFW001 form original PSA data. 
BEk Description Probability Distribution 










VE52AR Fan 52 fails to operate Gamma =4,00 
=10.854,52
Mission 3,69E-04 24 8,86E-03 
VK001O Motor-operated  valve 01 fails to remain open Gamma =3,00 
=802,55E+03 
Standby 3,74E-06 13140 2,46E-02 
VK001F Motor-operated  valve 01 fails to operate Gamma =2,00 
=15,76E+03 
Mission 1,27E-04 24 3,05E-03 
IH02AC Switch of Pump 02A fails to close Beta =8,00 
=2,742E+03 
Demand 2,92E-03 -- 2,92E-03 




Demand 1,46E-03 -- 1,46E-03 
M100B1
M 




Demand 1,24E-03 -- 1,24E-03 
BM02AR Motor-driven pump 02A fails to operate Gamma =29 
=579,59E+05
Mission 5,00E-05 24 1,20E-03 
VM035O Motor-operated valve fails to remain open Gamma =1,5 
=12,57E+06 
Standby 1,19E-07 13140 7,82E-04 
VE52AS Fan 52 fails to run Beta =2 
=2.698 
Demand 7,41E-04 -- 7,41E-04 
M500A1
M 
Maintenance of section A1 LogNormal Mean=4,48E-04 
EF=3,00
Demand 4,48E-04 -- 4,48E-04 
BM02AS Motor-driven pump 02 fails to run Beta =1 
=2,741 E+03 
Demand 3,65E-04 -- 3,65E-04 




Demand 3,00E-04 -- 3,00E-04 
 
 














































































































































































1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7,831E-01 7,831E-01 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6,105E-02 8,442E-01 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,507E-02 8,692E-01 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,487E-02 8,941E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1,743E-02 9,115E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1,021E-02 9,218E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4,890E-03 9,266E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4,904E-03 9,315E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 4,841E-03 9,364E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3,827E-03 9,402E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3,396E-03 9,436E-01 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3,364E-03 9,470E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,527E-03 9,495E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,540E-03 9,520E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,512E-03 9,546E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,500E-03 9,571E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,491E-03 9,595E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,493E-03 9,620E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,495E-03 9,645E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,481E-03 9,670E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,445E-03 9,695E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,265E-03 9,717E-01 
1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2,256E-03 9,740E-01 
1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,956E-03 9,759E-01 
1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,943E-03 9,779E-01 
1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1,268E-03 9,791E-01 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1,228E-03 9,804E-01 
1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 7,298E-04 9,811E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7,074E-04 9,818E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 7,027E-04 9,825E-01 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 6,950E-04 9,832E-01 
1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 5,001E-04 9,837E-01 
 





















































AS P(g) Cumulative 
probability 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 7,831E-01 7,831E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 1,110E-01 8,941E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 7 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,004E-02 9,142E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 0 0 3 1 1,743E-02 9,316E-01 
1 3 2 2 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 1,463E-02 9,462E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 0 1 1,021E-02 9,564E-01 
1 3 1 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 6,760E-03 9,632E-01 
1 1 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 5,319E-03 9,685E-01 
1 3 1 3 2 3 8 3 3 1 3 3 1 4,521E-03 9,730E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 0 3 2 3 3 1 3,828E-03 9,769E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 7 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,798E-03 9,797E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 0 0 3 1 2,475E-03 9,821E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 0 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,445E-03 9,846E-01 
1 3 2 3 2 3 8 2 3 2 3 3 1 2,349E-03 9,869E-01 
1 2 2 2 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 3 1 2,083E-03 9,890E-01 
1 2 2 3 2 3 8 3 3 2 3 0 1 1,472E-03 9,905E-01 
 
